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In her paper, “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial 
Fetishes,”1 Robin Zheng argues convincingly that the 'mere preferences' 
objection to the impermissibility of racialized sexual preferences fails. Zheng 
contends that racialized fetishes are morally objectionable, not “mere” personal 
preferences. She looks beyond the genealogy of the fetishizer’s preferences to 
analyze the disproportionate psychological burdens fetishizers place on the 
fetishized and the role these preferences play in reinforcing harmful racial 
stereotypes. I find Zheng’s reasoning compelling and interesting beyond its own 
scope because her work opens up ways of making similar arguments against the 
permissibility of any sexual preferences that reproduce systemic injustice. In this
paper I reconstruct Zheng’s argument, motivating her line of thought as best as I 
can, then I show how her argument can be extended to sexual preferences for 
inegalitarian sexual encounters. I begin by criticizing the idea that preferences 
for inegalitarian sex don’t stem from misogyny; I suspect that far more often 
than not these preferences are the result of sexism and misogyny, and at any rate 
we aren’t in the epistemic position to rule this out. But even if an individual’s 
inegalitarian preference did not have a misogynistic source, this would not imply
that acting on the preference is morally innocuous. Rather, the social harms 
caused by acting on such preferences render them morally troublesome.
Zheng’s Argument Against Racialized Preferences
1    See Langton, Rae. (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 22 (4): 293-330. 
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Zheng addresses what has been both an influential thesis in her field and 
a common view on racialized preferences: racialized preferences are 'mere 
preferences' and for this reason, racialized preferences are not morally 
objectionable. Mere preferences are aesthetic or personal preferences that are 
generally considered morally innocuous. Examples of mere preferences may 
include preferences for hair color, height or style of dress. For instance, 
happening to only want to date, have sex with or be romantically involved with 
people with generous beards would count as a mere preference. My example of 
a predilection for the generously bearded would strike most people as morally 
acceptable. Indeed, I guess that many share the belief that people have basic 
aesthetic preferences about sex and that these are not particularly morally 
troubling. More importantly, it is unreasonable to think that people ought not 
discriminate on any basis at all with regard to their sexual partners. That sounds 
uncomfortably like claiming that people owe one another an open possibility of 
sexual partnership; most people place great importance on their preferences for 
certain groups, such as sexes or genders. 
Zheng reconstructs the common sense, 'mere preferences' argument 
often used to claim that racialized preferences are also morally innocuous: 
1. There is nothing morally objectionable about sexual 
preferences for hair color, eye color, and other non-racialized 
phenotypic traits. 
2. Preferences for racialized physical traits are not morally 
different from preferences for non-racialized phenotypic traits. 
Therefore, 
3. ‘Mere’ preferences for racialized phenotypic traits are not 
morally objectionable.2
Zheng argues that we should reject the second premise. The first reason 
she gives for doing so is that those very traits assumed to be morally innocuous 
2    Zheng, Robin. (2016). “Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial 
Fetishes.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2 (3), 400-419.
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are, in fact, based on harmful stereotypes, and it is for this reason that the mere 
preferences argument fails. She draws from literature that strongly suggests that 
the so-called mere preferences stem from racial stereotypes. For instance, Zheng
cites a study in which non-Asian men dating Asian women were interviewed. 
The interviewees initially disavowed racial stereotypes of Asian women as 
submissive but later they used language that effectively depicted Asian women 
as submissive.3 Zhen reviews a staggering amount of literature supporting the 
conclusion that many with racialized preferences also harbor racist beliefs. The 
empirical evidence alone should incline most to be skeptical that racialized 
preferences reflect mere aesthetic ones, according to Zheng. 
More importantly, it seems difficult or impossible to rule out the 
possibility that racialized preferences stem from racial stereotypes. In a world 
where racial hierarchies persist and racist stereotypes are ubiquitous and 
insidious, it may be impossible to know where one’s preferences stem from. 
Even if a person has good reason to believe she knows the origin of a particular 
preference – perhaps a first serious partner embodied this preference – she can't 
rule out the effects of objectionable cultural factors accompanying the innocuous
main factor. This discernment seems especially impossible given the subtle 
influences of media and popular culture. 
However, even if someone could somehow know for certain that her 
racialized preference did not stem from any harmful stereotype, it does not 
follow that there is no reason to find racialized preferences morally 
objectionable. Zheng identifies an alternative – and in her view a more effective 
and just – means of criticizing racialized preferences. She claims that because 
acting on these preferences takes a disproportionate psychological toll on the 
fetishized, racialized preferences are morally objectionable regardless of their 
3   Ibid. 405.
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origins. 
Zheng argues that there are externalities of racialized preferences that 
merit consideration, and that we should shift our gaze from the origins of an 
individual’s preference to the social effects of the preference. In this hierarchical
world, the targets of racialized sexual preferences can feel depersonalized and 
otherized. The fetishized must negotiate their reasonable doubts regarding the 
motives behind their partners’ love for them, questioning their status as a unique 
person in the eyes of their partners. Those affected by particularly pervasive 
racialized fetishization constantly and systematically experience these nagging 
thoughts and they often adjust their behavior in light of them. This constant 
mental struggle takes a very real psychological toll on a person, and this toll is 
disproportionate and unjust. Zheng appeals to intuitions regarding justice to 
motivate the belief that certain preferences ought to be subject to moral 
evaluation: “It is morally problematic, indeed unjust, when some people suffer 
disproportionate harms or burdens on the basis of their race and when they are 
wrongly represented in their sexual capacities.”4
Zheng argues that in themselves these psychological burdens constitute 
a disadvantage on the basis of race, but they also have broader societal 
consequences. Even in the best cases of coupling motivated by racialized 
preferences , the partnerships could still inadvertently enforce racial stereotypes.
Zheng draws from Charles Mills’ observation about black men marrying white 
women; she writes, “Even if it were possible for such men to be free of the 
suspicion that they are motivated by racial self-contempt, the meaning of their 
actions would be, in his words, ‘sending a message to the world that ... black 
women just ain’t good enough.’”5 Zheng recalls the words of another 
4   Ibid. 407.
5   Ibid. 412.
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interviewee, an Asian woman, “That’s how people see me, as somebody who 
should be with a white man.”6 Even those who aren’t in interracial or other such 
socially significant relationships feel the impact of the salience of their sexual 
choices. 
These observations do not lead Zheng to make a broad 
recommendation to avoid certain sexual or romantic relationships; she is not 
claiming that black men should never marry white women. Instead, she is 
motivating the claim that sexual preferences are subject to moral consideration 
of their social impact. It might strike some as unfair that other people’s racist 
interpretations could color ethical judgment of their preferences. Even more 
worrisome, people who don’t have racialized preferences but who happen to be 
in a relationship susceptible to interpretation as racist might inadvertently 
promote prejudice. However  Zheng can reply that her compilation of empirical 
evidence shows it is racialized preference usually comes into being under the 
influence of racism. It would be inappropriate to condemn your preference for 
the heavily bearded unless this preference likely came from bigoted beliefs 
stemming from a history of oppression of bearded people. But even if the origin 
of your preference is innocent, I suspect Zheng's best reply is to point out that 
the fact that certain couples will have to negotiate harmful social interpretations 
or be burdened with contributing to these interpretations is just another harm 
caused by racialized preferences, and the hierarchies from which they are born. 
The Inegalitarian Extension
Zheng opens up for us the possibility there could be other sexual 
preferences that are morally problematic, cases where the preference is 
“systematized so as to track and reproduce institutions of oppression, even if 
6   Ibid. 411.
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they glorify rather than stigmatize.”7 Using the broad contours of Zheng’s 
argument, I will show how a similar case can be made that acting on preferences
for heterosexual activity that subordinates women is morally problematic.8 
By inegalitarian sex I am referring to a preference for the type of sex 
often depicted in mainstream pornography.9 A. W. Eaton refers to this 
pornography as inegalitarian pornography, “Sexually explicit representations 
that as a whole eroticize relations (acts, scenarios, or postures) characterized by 
gender inequity.”10  While Eaton is characterizing a certain kind of pornography, 
I think the kind of sex it depicts manifests the type of sexual preferences I wish 
to discuss. Importantly, the kind of inegalitarian sex I am concerned with in this 
paper just is much of what is eroticized in mainstream pornography. These 
sexual activities include, but are in no way limited to, the eroticization of 
violence towards women or of demeaning or subordinating sexual relations, 
scenarios with a clear power imbalance (even if consensual), or scenarios in 
7   Ibid. 413.
8    For the time being, this thesis applies to men and women engaging in heterosexual 
sex. In forthcoming papers, I plan to consider what this argument means for gender non-
conforming individuals and those having Queer sex. I have chosen to narrow this 
argument not because I believe it is sufficient to address only heterosexual relations but 
because I believe a more careful argument (exceeding the bounds of this project) is 
necessary to tease out the implications of inegalitarian preferences in Queer sex, and 
because it is not clear to me that the mainstream inegalitarian sex to which I refer 
includes those in Queer communities. As a result, I am not confident that this argument in
its simple form holds up when applied to Queer sex.
9    I want to be clear about the types of preferences I am examining. For probably 
obvious reasons, this argument may have implications for people with a preference for 
BDSM (bondage/discipline/dominance/submission/sadism/masochism) sexual activity. I 
will not be including this community in my discussion despite the fact that my 
conclusions may implicate the activity of at least some of these members of this group. A 
more careful examination of the ethics of acting on these preferences is necessary, 
especially as activity strictly confined to this group will likely not cause the harms I will 
detail in my discussion. Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes for pressing me on this point.
10   Eaton, A. W. (2007) “A Sensible Antiporn Feminism.” Ethics 117: 674–715. 
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which women’s pleasure is discounted. Like Eaton, I am not counting scenes 
where there are eroticized inegalitarian relations which are on a whole balanced 
– like partners taking turns being the dominant and submissive one – and I am 
taking “gender inequality” to refer to the subordination of women, not the 
subordination of men in heterosexual sex.11 
In an age where this type of encounter is widely depicted and 
normalized, I can imagine someone defending his sexual preferences as a mere 
quirk of his personality or a fun fact about the way he likes to have sex. I see 
this defense as in the spirit of the 'mere preference argument' with which Zheng 
takes issue. For the purposes of my paper, I would like to be a bit more explicit 
about what characterizes a 'mere preference'. I broadly conceive of 'mere 
preference' as any preferences relating to sex that most would consider morally 
innocuous. On my view, preference for a way of having sex – be it a specific sex
act, the language used during an encounter or the tone of the encounter – can 
count as mere preference. For instance, many people happen to be aroused by 
parts of their partner’s body that are not typically erogenous zones. Such an 
idiosyncrasy could reflect a simple sexual preference. But I reject what I take to 
be a common assumption that a preference for the kind of inegalitarian sex 
portrayed in mainstream pornography is a matter of 'mere' preference. 
Inegalitarian sexual preferences reproduce oppression; they are certainly not 
'mere' preferences.   
If sex acts and tone can count as some sort of mere preference, I can 
imagine someone arguing that preferences for inegalitarian sex are morally 
innocuous in a way similar to mere preferences: people simply like what they 
like. Like Zheng, I argue these preferences have significant links to gendered 
violence and the subordination of women but first I want to examine the idea of 
11   Ibid.
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the supposedly innocent origins of these preferences. Zheng is right that 
preferences are likely greatly shaped by the influence of the media, common 
beliefs and group membership, and that no one is unaffected by such social 
factors. For these reasons, I take it as likely that most people’s preferences are 
shaped to some extent by society. 
Sexual preferences aren’t formed in a vacuum; and I think it’s reasonable to think
that social factors play a role in the preferences we develop. I’ll give an account of how 
one particularly significant social factor influences sexual preference drawing on Rae 
Langton’s discussion on the 'authority' of pornography in her paper, “Speech Acts and
Unspeakable Acts.”12 I have said that the inegalitarian sex portrayed in 
pornography is representative of the type of sex someone with an inegalitarian 
sexual preference prefers. However, pornography is not merely representative of
this particular preference, it and its cultural ramifications actively shape 
inegalitarian sexual preferences. When Langton claims that pornography is 
authoritative, she means that pornography is considered a source of expert 
guidance on sexual relations, and that pornography has the power to endorse and
instruct. Through watching pornography or indirectly being exposed to its 
influence, people learn what is generally expected in a sexual encounter. 
Additionally, people don’t merely view pornography the way one would view an
action movie; they use pornography. For these reasons, pornography shapes not 
only people’s expectations and societal norms about sexualities and sex, but it 
physically encodes what is viewed as “sexy”.13 
I suspect that most would acknowledge that pornography is pervasive 
and that the pornography industry has a significant influence in the realms of 
advertising and the general media. For this reason, it seems few can escape 
12   Langton, Rae. (1993) “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 22 (4): 293-330.
13    Langton (1993). 
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experiencing the sexualized submission of women. If pornography is 
authoritative, and if it often depicts inegalitarian relations, and if it filters 
through to other, less explicit media, and if media and culture – broadly 
speaking – influence sexual preferences, then there is reason to suspect that 
inegalitarian pornography has some influence upon our preferences. In other 
words, given that the inegalitarian scenes depicted in and endorsed by 
pornography are pervasive and insidious, it seems very plausible that at least 
some – although I suspect it is the majority – of inegalitarian preferences stem 
from inegalitarian pornography. 
I argue that preference for inegalitarian sex likely stems in part from 
exposure to inegalitarian pornography, among other kinds of subliminal cultural 
messaging. Eaton provides further reasons to worry that a preference for 
inegalitarian sex involves stereotypical beliefs about women as it is particularly 
effective in encouraging acceptance of gender inequality:
Transforming gender inequality into a source of sexual 
gratification renders this inequality not just tolerable and easier to 
accept but also desirable and highly enjoyable....This eroticization
makes gender inequality appealing to men and women alike. 
Insofar as women want to be attractive to men, they internalize 
the subordinating norms of attractiveness and thereby collaborate 
in their own oppression.14
The point is not that pornography imposes just one stereotype on women, not all
women are portrayed as submissive; some women are assumed to be, for 
example, “feisty”, “aggressive”, or even asexual in virtue of their race, class, 
ability, sex assigned at birth, or other salient social identity. But it is still quite 
clear that women as a class are portrayed as subordinate, and so also actively 
subordinated, even if not every woman is portrayed as submissive. Pornography 
can draw from and perpetuate a rich history of oppressive stereotypes and this 
14    Eaton, A. W. (2007). 679-680.
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paper does by no means cover the extent of them. Considering all this, it seems 
we can respond to our defensive preferer of inegalitarian sex (and likely 
consumer of pornography) that his preferences likely can be traced back to some
sort of sexism. And at any rate, he isn’t in the position to know that his 
preferences don’t stem from some insidious (or overt) sexism.
Accordingly it is reasonable to believe that preferences for inegalitarian 
sex often stem from stereotypical, sexist beliefs about women. However even if 
a person could somehow know for sure that they lacked these stereotypical 
beliefs and that their sexual preferences did not stem from stereotypes about 
women, it does not follow that acting on such preferences is morally innocuous. 
A preference for inegalitarian sex harms the targets of the preference by 
wrongly representing them in their sexual capacities and agency.  For instance, 
the sexist belief that women like experiencing pain in sexual encounters might 
factor into the pornography people consume, which in turn affects their sexual 
preferences. In the post-Fifty Shades of Gray era, preferences for inegalitarian 
sex are no longer fringe (if they ever were). Specifically, inegalitarian sex 
harmfully objectifies women and prevents them from exploring their own 
sexualities.
The preference for inegalitarian sex harms the targets of the preference 
by wrongly representing them in their sexual capacities and actively thwarting 
certain sexual goods. Zheng succinctly observes that women are often “wrongly 
represented as only valuable in virtue of their sexual capacities, as desiring to be
raped, etc.”15 Generally, women are rendered objects of violent desire. The 
features Martha Nussbaum identifies as constituting objectification include that 
the woman is treated as an instrument of the other person’s sexual pleasure, as 
lacking autonomy, as interchangeable with other women, as something that can 
15   Zheng. (2016). 407.
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be owned, and as something whose feelings or wishes need not be considered. 
While some women may experience sexual pleasure from being objectified, 
many women do not. Objectification makes many feel grossly dehumanized and 
violated. It often renders women unable to negotiate their own desires in sex. It 
renders her desires irrelevant or deems them non-existent.
Objectification imposes psychological harm in itself and also in its effect 
of rendering people unable to flourish sexually. The feeling that this type of sex 
is normal can make women wonder if there is something wrong with them for 
not enjoying the inegalitarian sex, a self-doubt that could plausibly count as one 
of Miranda Fricker’s “hermeneutical injustices.” What should one think of not 
enjoying the thing that just is sexy, as determined by an authority on the matter?
Finally, the argument that inegalitarian preferences are morally neutral 
assumes that there is little gender inequality. Perhaps in an ideal world the 
sexual preferences I characterized as morally objectionable would not be so 
(because broader patterns and social context make these preferences 
troublesome.) Maybe in a world where women’s sexualities weren’t assumed to 
be masochistic it wouldn’t raise concern if a straight man happened to be 
interested in sex with a submissive female partner. But we don’t live in that ideal
world, so insisting that one’s preferences are morally innocuous (in the ideal 
world) doesn’t mean it’s just fine to act on those preferences in our world, 
especially when doing so would do harm and contribute to further injustice. 
Furthermore, inegalitarian pornography is produced to satisfy a demand 
and simultaneously reproduces the very demand which it satisfies. For this 
reason, the continued preference for inegalitarian sex contributes to the 
continued production of inegalitarian pornography which perpetuates its social 
acceptance. Preferences for inegalitarian sex support stereotypes about women’s 
natural subordination by feeding into an industry that in turn perpetuates this 
belief. Maybe in a vacuum racialized preferences or preferences for inegalitarian
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sex would be morally unobjectionable. Or maybe even in an unjust world these 
preferences could be innocuous if only they were less ubiquitous. However, our 
world has a messy legacy of a continuous history of oppression, and responsible 
people aiming to do good should strive to behave in such a way that makes our 
world a more just place, even if this aim means we must give up preferences 
which we would indulge in a more ideal world. 
There are hard cases for my objections which intuitively seem immune to
them. What about the feminist couple that engages in inegalitarian sex in the 
privacy of their own home when they’re not volunteering in their community or 
otherwise exemplifying excellent character and citizenship? What about the 
person whose first relationship had elements of inegalitarian sex and who has 
come to develop a strong preference for it as a result? In a context where sexual 
decisions take on a significance in light of social injustice, one may have a 
reason in favor for not acting on or trying to change a preference. Sometimes 
life is complicated, but this doesn’t mean that our choices can’t be morally 
evaluated, and there is still room for saying a different choice is preferable. 
 Furthermore, the fact someone ought to have acted differently does not 
automatically imply that we have all-things-considered reason to blame them. In
a deeply unjust world, I don’t really have the appetite to condemn the woman 
who prefers inegalitarian sex. It’s hard enough for some women to have 
fulfilling sexual and romantic relationships; I’m not interested in blaming those 
who are oppressed by virtue of their gender. But the fact that some women have 
inegalitarian preferences does not render those preferences innocuous even 
when both parties enthusiastically offer their consent. 
Importantly, my criticism does not depend on the contents of a person’s 
mind – whether she believes herself to be inferior, her partner’s intentions, etc. 
Nor is the issue strictly a matter of obtaining consent. Consent does not morally 
good (or not bad) sex make! All parties could feel good about their inegalitarian 
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sex and not even be directly harmed, nonetheless it perpetuates the harms of 
inegalitarian sex as  an instance of a larger pattern that is morally objectionable.
Conclusion
Much of the force of the 'mere preferences' line of reasoning is that a 
preference for  inegalitarian sex, like other mere preferences, is morally 
unobjectionable or socially insignificant. This ignores, I argue, the fact that these
inegalitarian  preferences are morally problematic because of their social 
consequences which include, but are not limited to: reinforcing the sexist beliefs
from which the preferences stem, preventing women from experiencing certain 
sexual goods, wrongly portraying women as valuable insofar as they gratify 
men, wrongly portraying women as limited in their sexual capacities, preventing
the formation of more egalitarian relationships, and in some of the worst cases, 
causing what is widely recognized as deeply harmful, immoral sex (rape, for 
example)16.  
Maybe in a vacuum racialized preferences or preferences for inegalitarian sex 
would be morally unobjectionable. Or maybe even in an unjust world these preferences 
could be innocuous if only they were less ubiquitous. However, our world has a messy 
legacy of a continuous history of oppression, and responsible people aiming to do good 
should strive to behave in a way that makes our world a more just place, even if this aim 
means we must give up preferences which we could indulge in a more ideal world.   
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